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Abstract 
This paper shows how the separation and subsequent reintegration of a subsidiary becomes a 
source of strategic renewal for the parent company. We develop a process model that reveals 
how structural ambidexterity can generate ‘proximate isomorphism’ that gives rise to parent 
level exploration and the parent’s gradual convergence with the subsidiary. This creates the 
conditions for reintegration, and ultimately, strategic renewal. We identify the triggers for 
proximate isomorphism as well as the mechanisms through which it unfolds. We draw on the 
longitudinal analysis of strategic renewal of Immochan between 2006 and 2018. Our findings 
contribute to extant research by developing the link between structural ambidexterity and 
strategic renewal and, particularly, by showing that proximate isomorphism acts an integrating 
mechanism between the parent and the explorative unit. 
Keywords: structural ambidexterity, integrating mechanisms, strategic renewal, corporate 
parent, isomorphism 
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Introduction 
The simultaneous exploitation of an existing strategy while exploring new capabilities is one 
of the core challenges for organizations (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009; Birkinshaw and 
Gupta, 2013; O'Reilly III and Tushman, 2008). For that to happen, explorative units are often 
temporarily structurally separated in order to nurture their innovative potential, tap into 
alternative revenue streams (Gilbert, 2005; Raisch, 2008; Raisch et al., 2009; Raisch and 
Tushman, 2016) and avoid tensions between innovative endeavors and existing strategies 
(Duncan, 1976; Markides, 2008; O'Reilly III and Tushman, 2008; O'Reilly III and Tushman, 
2013; Nosella et al., 2012). Importantly, apart from balancing different objectives (Birkinshaw 
and Gupta, 2013), prior research also argues that structural separation has the potential for 
strategic renewal of the firm as a whole (Khanagha et al., 2014). Indeed, for O’Reilly and 
Tushman (2013: 333) the need to implement ambidextrous solutions “is about survival.” 
Raisch (2008) suggests that structural separation might actually lead to, what he calls, 
‘reverse nurturing’; knowledge flows from the explorative unit that result in capability 
development in other units of the organization. Also, Siggelkow and Levinthal (2003) point 
out that the potential for renewal is only unleashed by reintegrating the separated unit. These 
examples point to two broader questions. On the one hand, it highlights the importance of 
integrating mechanisms that coordinate resources and knowledge flows (Gilbert, 2006; 
Kauppila, 2010; Jansen et al., 2009; Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008). On the other, these 
examples suggest that strategic renewal via structural ambidexterity is a process (Simsek, 2009) 
that involves both the separation as well as the reintegration phases over time. Yet, we do not 
have an in-depth understanding of the integrating mechanisms through which separated units 
influence the corporate parent, nor do we fully understand the processual aspects of structural 
ambidexterity that result in separation and reintegration. Based on these gaps, we address the 
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following research question: What are the mechanisms through which structural ambidexterity 
leads to strategic renewal of the focal firm over time? 
 In order to address this question we analyze the transformation of Immochan*1, the real 
estate division of Auchan Group* between 2006 and 2018. From 2008 to 2014, Immochan 
adopted a structurally ambidextrous form by separating the exploitation of its core retail 
portfolio from the exploration of a new trend called ‘New Urbanism’. In 2008, Immochan spun 
out Citania as a standalone unit fully devoted to developing New Urbanism yet reintegrated it 
in 2014. We explore the process by which Immochan separated and eventually reintegrated 
Citania and trace the transformation of Immochan over time. This enables us to shed light on 
how the dynamic relationship between explorative and exploitative units over time may result 
in strategic renewal of the parent company. Based on these findings this paper makes three 
theoretical contributions.  
First, this paper reveals the implications of structural ambidexterity for parent level 
strategic renewal. We enhance Raisch (2008) by confirming the role of separated units in 
breaking parent level path dependency and by spelling out the process through which this 
happens. Second, our findings show that structurally separated units may be integrated via, 
what we call, “proximate isomorphism”. We use this notion to describe parent level activities 
involved in imitating the separated unit which, spatially and culturally, is located at short 
distance. The concept of proximate isomorphism extends one of the core debates in research 
on structural ambidexterity: research on the integration mechanisms that link separated units 
to other parts of the organization (Kauppila, 2010; Gilbert, 2006; Bennett and Robson, 1999). 
We explain the mechanisms through which proximate isomorphism unfolds and theorize the 
conditions under which it is likely to occur. Third, this paper also contribute to the emerging 
‘dynamic view’ of organizational ambidexterity that acknowledges that the solutions to the 
                                                 
1 * indicates definition of concepts in the glossary in Appendix 2 
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ambidexterity challenge may shift over time (Simsek, 2009; Markides, 2013). We highlight 
two mechanisms that underpin this transformation, governance changes and the 
depersonalization of legitimacy.  
Ambidexterity and strategic renewal: Review of prior research 
Strategic renewal describes the process, content and outcome of changes in the organization 
that affect the long-term viability of the firm (Agarwal and Helfat, 2009). Strategic renewal 
requires firms to deploy their capabilities in a new way (Danneels, 2010) or develop a set of 
new capabilities that would allow them to successfully compete in future (McNamara and 
Baden-Fuller, 1999; Volberda et al., 2001; Baden-Fuller and Volberda, 1997). Renewal is often 
triggered by external ‘shocks’ such as technological innovations and increasing competition 
that force firms to react (Chandler Jr, 1962; Ahuja and Katila, 2004) or can be the result of 
autonomous, bottom up initiatives (Regnér, 2003; Pandza, 2011; Mirabeau and Maguire, 
2014). 
While change in the light of external pressures is difficult enough, renewal is even more 
difficult in situations of ‘fit’; when firms are well aligned to the market and there is no 
immediate reason for change (Siggelkow, 2001). Challenges for strategic renewal are manifold. 
Strategies are often deeply embedded in shared and taken for granted assumptions about 
customers, competition as well as the resources and capabilities at the disposal of a firm, which 
make it difficult for managers to envisage alternative strategies (Johnson, 1988; Barr et al., 
1992; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Danneels, 2010). Renewal might be inhibited by the 
organizational context in terms of routines for strategic planning and budgeting for example, 
which might drive out autonomous, bottom up initiatives that have the potential to shape the 
strategy for the firm (Burgelman, 1983; Burgelman, 2002). Put differently, to ensure strategic 
renewal, firms need to find ways to exploit existing capabilities; yet renewal also requires 
explorative and path breaking activities that are able to overcome the commitment to an 
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existing strategy (March, 1991; Sydow et al., 2009; Burgelman, 2002; O'Reilly III et al., 2009; 
Raisch et al., 2009; Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008).  
Prior research suggests that a solution to these challenges is organizational ambidexterity 
(Agarwal and Helfat, 2009; O'Reilly III and Tushman, 2013). The term ambidexterity describes 
“an organization’s capacity to address two organizationally incompatible objectives equally 
well” (Birkinshaw and Gupta, 2013: 291) which requires firms to “reconcile internal tensions 
and conflicting demands in their task environments” (Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008: 375). Such 
conflicting demands may arise from the simultaneous pursuit of both explorative and 
exploitative strategies (Floyd and Lane, 2000; Turner et al., 2013) and, linked to that, the need 
to balancing autonomous initiatives and induced forms of strategy making (Burgelman, 2002; 
Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008; Regnér, 2003). Thus, ambidexterity is about “the multitude of 
ways that organizations sought to manage the tensions involved in doing two different things 
at the same time” (Birkinshaw and Gupta, 2013: , p. 288). If implemented appropriately, 
ambidextrous solutions allow firms to avoid competency traps (Levinthal and March, 1993) 
and potentially achieve radical transformation (Agarwal and Helfat, 2009). 
As exploitative and explorative strategies are based on different structural prerequisites 
(March, 1991), the joint pursuit of exploitation and exploitation may be achieved through 
complex organizational designs (Raisch, 2008) but also inter-organizational solutions such as 
alliances or acquisitions (Mom et al., 2009; Stettner and Lavie, 2014; Kauppila, 2010). Prior 
research emphasized that firms may simultaneously pursue exploitative and explorative 
strategies (Raisch, 2008) via structurally separating explorative and exploitative units (Duncan, 
1976). Such a solution is considered to be particularly beneficial if severe conflicts between 
new, innovative initiatives and the existing business due to fundamental differences in values 
and capabilities can be anticipated and managed (Markides, 2013). Structural separation allows 
the existing unit to retain its strategy while the new unit can adopt structures and capabilities 
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that are adequate in this particular context (Siggelkow and Levinthal, 2003). For instance, 
Immelt et al. (2009) show how GE separated units pursuing frugal innovations in India from 
the main R&D organization in order to protect the fledgling business from the established 
administrative structures at GE. Over the years, a plethora of empirical studies has found a 
positive relationship between firm performance and such structural separation (e.g. Jansen et 
al., 2009; He and Wong, 2004; Lubatkin et al., 2006).  
Yet, this does not imply that explorative and exploitative units remain isolated. These units 
are connected at the corporate level (Benner and Tushman, 2003) and firms need to put 
mechanisms in place that integrate explorative and exploitative activities (Gilbert, 2006; 
Kauppila, 2010; Jansen et al., 2009; Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008). Here the term ‘integrate’ 
refers to coordination and knowledge flows between the various units. Prior research suggests 
that these integrating mechanisms could takes structural forms or may be socially embedded. 
Structural integrating mechanisms may involve the synergistic combination of practices (Kim 
and Rhee, 2009) or the formation of cross-functional teams and processes (Jansen et al., 2009). 
Behavioral forms of integration may involve the adoption of paradoxical mindsets that allows 
the management team to manage seemingly conflicting objectives (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 
2009; Smith and Tushman, 2005) and top management team approaches to decision making 
that draw on contradictory knowledge requirements (Lubatkin et al., 2006). These integrating 
mechanisms are crucial to align explorative units with the existing organization but are also a 
source of knowledge flows (Kauppila, 2010; Raisch, 2008). 
Importantly, recent research increasingly takes a dynamic perspective, which suggests that 
the relationship between separated units evolves over time (Simsek, 2009). Indeed, Raisch and 
Tushman (2016) explore how the interplay between units and the corporate center changes as 
explorative businesses mature. Moreover, the need for separation might not endure. For 
instance, prior research assumes that the full potential of structural separation for the entire 
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organization might only be realized if the business is ultimately absorbed into the organization 
(Siggelkow and Levinthal, 2003). Apart from this work, the activities and conditions that shape 
reintegration have not received in-depth empirical research attention (O'Reilly III and 
Tushman, 2013). 
Finally, the mechanisms through which structural ambidexterity results in renewal at the 
level of the corporate parent are not well understood (Turner et al., 2013). Raisch (2008) does 
make the case that the separation of units may have path breaking consequences in other units 
of the same firm. Others, like Khanagha et al. (2014) and Siggelkow and Levinthal (2003) 
argue that reintegration plays an important part in renewal. Yet, the question remains how the 
tensions that required separation in the first place are managed (Markides, 2008). Thus, if 
reintegration plays an important role for strategic renewal through structural ambidexterity, we 
need a more in-depth understanding of the process through which such reintegration occurs 
and how it might lead to strategic renewal. The objective of this paper, therefore, is to extend 
existing ambidexterity theory by addressing the following research question: What are the 
mechanisms through which structural ambidexterity lead to strategic renewal of the focal firm 
over time?  
Methodology 
This paper is based on a longitudinal inductive case study design, (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008) 
that is particularly warranted when addressing the “when and “how” questions in management 
research and aiming to develop new theory (Yin, 2009; Siggelkow, 2007). Given the emerging 
state of knowledge regarding the processes through which an organization could accomplish 
strategic renewal through structural ambidexterity, such a research design can facilitate new 
insights into the implications of structural ambidexterity. 
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Research context 
In this study, we investigate the transformation of Immochan, the real estate development 
division of the Auchan Group, one of the leading retail chains in France, Europe and Asia. IN 
From 2008 - 2014 Immochan adopted a structurally ambidextrous design by separating the 
exploitation of its core business from a new, explorative initiative. The first real estate company 
in French history to be part of a retail chain, Immochan’s mission was to “promote, 
commercialize, exploit and manage the properties of the shopping areas developed on Auchan* 
sites” (Immochan website, 2006). Immochan’s strategy was to develop and exploit the existing 
property portfolio of the Auchan Group. 
Thus for most of the firm’s history, Immochan’s mandate has been to acquire land around 
the group’s hypermarkets* and renting out commercial retail spaces to third parties. Immochan 
had been a leader in the commercial real estate sector in the 1970s and 1980s and the benefits 
to the Auchan Group were high; Immochan was considered the cash cow of the group for 
international expansion. During the 1990s competitors not only started to imitate Immochan’s 
approach to property development, but also became successful in more innovative forms of 
development, particularly with regard to commercial, architectural and urban aspects of 
shopping centers. Nevertheless, despite changes in the environment, Immochan continued to 
follow its strategic mandate.  
In 2008, Immochan created Citania, a new subsidiary dedicated to developing new urban 
projects that combined housing, office and retail space. We consider the creation of Citania as 
a significant explorative initiative that diverged from Immochan’s core activities. The creation 
of Citania was driven by Pierre, a senior manager at Immochan who openly criticized 
Immochan’s overly narrow market focus and propagated a more innovative approach to 
property development. Pierre served as the CEO of Citania for 6 years (2008–2014). During 
this period, Citania began to spearhead a new trend in urban design and to develop a set of 
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capabilities that were quite different from Immochan’s traditional approach to property 
development.  
In 2014, Immochan decided to fully reintegrate Citania. Indeed, by 2014 Immochan’s 
mission statement, strategic position and capabilities mirrored those of Citania, eliminating the 
need to maintain two separate units. One of the main indicators of Immochan’s strategic 
renewal was the development of a huge urban project comprised of a leisure park, offices, a 
conference center, hotels and a variety of retail spaces. Moreover, Immochan engaged in urban 
development thus fully adopting the mission initially set by Citania. Figure 1 provides an 
overview of the main events. 
------------ INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE ------------ 
Table 1 provides information on the revenue generated by the main units of the company: 
the Auchan Group, (both worldwide and in France), Immochan (both worldwide and in 
France), and Citania, the new subsidiary of Immochan. Table 1 shows that Immochan’s 
revenue increased after Citania was spun out. Thus, the creation of Citania was not linked to 
any short-term need to change Immochan’s business model. Also, Citania’s revenue 
represented less than 0.5% of Immochan’s turnover. The difference in scale is due the scope of 
activities and to the fact that Citania and Immochan had different revenue models. Citania 
operated on a partnership model and charged fees for project coordination. Unlike Immochan, 
Citania did not own land or buildings, nor did it operate as a landlord. Citania was set up as a 
possible avenue for future business without financial expectations. The actual revenues were 
considered as non-expected financial success.  
------------ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE ------------ 
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Data collection 
Our paper traces the activities that preceded and superseded the creation of Citania in 2008 and 
its reintegration in 2014. We draw on observational data, interviews, internal documents and 
media coverage. 
Observational data. Between 2006 and 2008, one of the authors spent 27 months at 
Immochan as a non-participant observer. During this period, he attended 17 meetings (16 of 
which were audio recorded and transcribed, one of which was documented through detailed 
notes) in which opportunities for the development of future shopping centers were discussed, 
sometimes with external parties. These meetings provided deep insights into how Immochan’s 
managers framed opportunities and how they intended to shape the future of the firm. Thus, 
strategy formulation and implementation were highly intertwined (Dietrich and Lehtonon, 
2005; Unger et al., 2012). These observational data provided us with a detailed account of 
Immochan’s approach to property development before the creation of Citania and enabled us 
to understand the tensions Immochan staff experienced and how they dealt with them. These 
observational data were supplemented by informal conversations with project managers, 
regional directors, architects, urban planners, marketing directors and partners before or after 
meetings (e.g., after a very important meeting with a potential competitor). These informal 
conversations were crucial to building trust with informants and better understanding the 
context of the company, as well as the relationships between actors. 
Interviews. We began our data collection efforts by conducting three preliminary 
interviews with senior and middle managers, followed by 38 semi-structured interviews with 
11 informants, including project managers, the head of sales, regional managers, the head of 
marketing, developers and sales partners. These interviews were crucial to helping us better 
understand Immochan’s strategy, how people dealt with Immochan’s constraints and the 
creation of Citania. Most informants were interviewed at least twice in order to understand the 
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unfolding of events over time. During the interviews, we asked informants to describe the 
projects they were working on at that time, their main contributions, and successes and 
challenges they had encountered during project development. Interviews lasted between 45 
minutes and 2.75 hours. Moreover, we conducted 23 informal interviews with Pierre, a senior 
manager at Immochan with extensive networks within the organization and robust relationships 
with members of the corporate senior leadership team, who became the CEO of Citania. We 
consider Pierre to be a key informant (Ryan, 2008) through which the relationship between 
Citania and Immochan can be depicted. We conducted the interviews outside of the company 
context, which enabled Pierre to reflect freely on the events within Immochan and Citania. We 
also interviewed the Immochan’s General Manager (2006-2015) and now President (2015-
2018). This interview helped us to better understand the process from Immochan’s top 
management’s perspective. 
Documents. We collected 25 documents from Immochan and Citania. These documents 
include presentations of Citania mission and activities (7 versions from 2008 to 2013), 
consulting reports as well as training documentation. These documents helped us to better 
understand the way Citania developed as well as the relationship between Citania and 
Immochan. These sources appear as an important source of triangulation with the interview 
data.  
Media coverage. We also draw on media coverage of Immochan and Citania for the period 
2006 to 2018. The property development and retail sectors have their own professional journals 
that reported on the situation at Immochan and Citania. We triangulated these data with the 
interviews and the internal documents. The triangulation process revealed that in many cases, 
macro-level information had been released to the professional press, but micro-level 
information had not. The micro perspective provided by our key informant and the interview 
with Immochan’s President created a much richer, nuanced narrative that enabled us to 
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understand the backstage dynamics surrounding key events. Table 2 summarizes the data we 
collected and the way we used it in the analysis. 
------------ INSERT TABLE 2 HERE ------------ 
Data analysis 
We engaged in an intertwined data collection and analysis process in order to align our data 
collection efforts with emerging interpretations. For our process analysis, we combined 
grounded theory and temporal bracketing approaches to data analysis (Langley, 1999). This 
resulted in a coding procedure that enabled us to develop a process theory of strategic renewal 
based on structural ambidexterity in which three temporal periods have been identified. While 
the analysis process was far from linear, we describe the sequential logic of our analysis. 
In first step of data analysis, we organized our data chronologically. While some data 
sources were clearly nested in time, others (like retrospective interviews) had to be allocated 
to particular time periods. This allowed provided the basis for subsequent coding.  
Second, we engaged in descriptive coding (Miles et al., 2014). Initial descriptive coding 
enabled us to trace important topics and activities that were addressed in the various data 
sources.  These activities refer to Immochan’s strategy and the change of the organization over 
time. These codes referred to Interview data was triangulated with documents, and 
observational data. The analysis of strategic renewal is based on the triangulation of internal 
data sources and external media coverage. We then performed axial coding by aggregating 
descriptive codes into more abstract conceptual themes (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Tables 3-
5 provide the trail of evidence for the main concepts used our theoretical model. As for 
processual studies, these categories should not be considered as causal conditions but rather as 
necessary elements (Langley and Tsoukas, 2010) that happened for strategic renewal to take 
place through structural ambidexterity. 
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Third, we explored the relationships between categories throughout the 12-year process in 
order to understand strategic renewal at Immochan. In our analysis, the relationships between 
concepts not only set concepts “in motion” (Gioia et al. 2013: p. 8); they are key components 
of the analysis. Consequently, each period has its own rationale, representing a set of coherent 
mechanisms linking categories. This step results in three key time periods that are articulated 
through three main elements of structural ambidexterity. Period 1 is characterized by 
organizational tensions and leads up to the creation of Citania as an explorative subsidiary; 
time period 2 describes the evolution of Citania and Immochan’s reaction to Citania’s 
operations that result in the emergence of new tensions. Finally, period 3 starts with the 
decision to reintegrate Citania into Immochan and ends with the final implementation of 
reintegration. In doing so, we provide an analysis of the mechanisms though which the process 
moves from one period to another. Our findings section is based on a narrative that present 
these periods though the order themes and their relations.  
Immochan’s renewal through structural separation and re-integration 
After a long period of stability, Immochan substantially transformed over a relatively short 
period of time through a process occasioned by structural ambidexterity. While the separation 
of an explorative initiative initially allowed the parent company to maintain its exploitative 
strategy, we show that the increasing legitimacy of key individuals as well as of the explorative 
unit as a whole, triggered, what we call, ‘proximate isomorphism’: activities on the level of the 
parent company aimed at imitating the capabilities of the both spatially and culturally 
‘proximate’ explorative unit. We show that proximate isomorphism was underpinned by 
vicarious learning about the explorative unit changes in parent level governance, in particular 
the composition of the management team. Proximate isomorphism gave rise to substantial 
explorative activities at the parent level. This set in motion the strategic convergence of the 
parent and the explorative unit, and thus allowed the reintegration of the explorative unit. This 
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was necessary for the parent to appropriate the market legitimacy already established by the 
explorative unit and ‘depersonalize’ its association with key individuals involved with the 
initial initiative. These findings are represented as a process model in Figure 2. Below we 
provide in-depth empirical evidence for these findings. 
------------ INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE ------------ 
Period 1: Mitigating tensions through structural separation  
In this section, we unpack the exploitative logic of Immochan’s strategy and the growing 
tensions between Immochan’s dominant logic (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) and individuals that 
suggested an alternative approach to property development. In order to resolve these tensions 
Immochan decided to separate this alternative approach in a new subsidiary, called Citania (see 
Table 3). 
------------ INSERT TABLE 3 HERE ------------ 
Exploitative strategy at Immochan. Traditionally, Immochan’s business model had been 
based on designing and building shopping centers adjacent to the hypermarkets owned by the 
Auchan Group. Indeed, the company had been the leader in commercial real estate in France 
since the 1970s. The exploitative strategy of Immochan was predominantly fueled by existing 
organizational structures and processes as well as the deeply engrained mindset of commercial 
real estate development among Immochan’s top managers. 
At this period of time, Immochan mainly existed as a kind of service that would buy 
property and commercialize shopping galleries. It was rather Auchan that was sourcing 
and developing new sites (Immochan President, Interview-2018). 
Immochan’s structures and processes shaped strategy implementation. Its embeddedness 
within the Auchan Group and its mandate to support Auchan’s strategy, constrained the types 
of projects the company could pursue. For instance, the key consideration for any new project 
was how it affected the respective hypermarket of the target site; any new development 
activities had to support the success of the corresponding hypermarket. Auchan’s hypermarket 
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directors would have a right to veto newf projects. Moreover, in order to ensure that Immochan 
supported Auchan’s strategy, management positions were staffed by Auchan executives. This 
close alignment between Immochan’s activities and the hypermarkets is illustrated in the 
following quote from one of Immochan’s regional directors. He described how obtaining 
support from hypermarket directors was absolutely crucial to advancing any new development 
project.  
Even if they [project managers] can imagine something great, it can only be realized if 
the hypermarket director agrees. (Integrated Mall Regional Director, Interview-2007) 
Immochan could not therefore diverge from its exploitative strategy, even if it would be 
beneficial for other aspects of its business. This rigidity was further maintained by strict return 
on investment (ROI) thresholds tied to hypermarket profitability for any new project.  The retail 
spaces developed by Immochan were twice as profitable as office real estate and four times 
more profitable compared to the development of housing.  
Apart from Immochan’s embeddedness in the Auchan Group, the exploitative strategy was 
also based on deeply ingrained habits and beliefs about what constitutes commercial real estate 
development. For example, the relationship between the size of the parking lot and the size of 
the hypermarket was based on a specific ratio that could not be altered: during the peak 
shopping periods (e.g. weekends in December) all customers should be able to find a parking 
slot. Thus, parking lot sizes were based on the expected number of customers during these 
weekends, even if they were severely underutilized throughout most of the year: 
[..] what is very important on all sites, it’s the parking spots. We have a proverb that says: 
no parking, no business! That is to say that the more parking, the more people come! 
(Project Manager, Interview-2006) 
The assumption was that all customers would drive to the hypermarkets, park, shop, pay and 
drive back home. Connecting hypermarkets to public transportation was not part of 
Immochan’s approach to developing retail spaces.  
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The stability of Immochan’s business resulted in an overall lack of ambition in terms of 
company operations and the projects they chose to pursue. The hypermarket was 
metaphorically defined as the locomotive of the site and the shopping centers were viewed as 
a way to increase the profitability of the already existing property. Managers viewed other 
approaches as “too ambitious” and misaligned with Immochan’s framework. This was 
particularly evident during meetings in which new development opportunities were discussed. 
Ambitious projects were frequently ridiculed and the people who proposed these initiatives 
were laughed at. Project managers were increasingly frustrated by this lack of ambition: 
On this site, I’m not satisfied with the hypermarket, the gallery* or the surrounding 
area. I’m not satisfied with the site ambition statement… In my view, this is not 
ambitious enough! (Project Manager, Immochan, Meeting-2008) 
 
Explorative initiative leading to individual level legitimacy. Despite its financial success, 
Immochan faced internal pressure to change. All of this pressure came from the same source: 
Pierre, the urban manager, who began to campaign for an alternative model of commercial 
property development that combines commercial real estate with housing and office space. 
Pierre was a top manager at Immochan France. After being a civil servant with entrepreneurial 
ambitions, he joined the firm in the late 1980s as a member of the property department. In 
2000, he became the head of the new urbanism and land organization department, thereby 
establishing his legitimacy in Immochan. However, his views of Immochan’s traditional mode 
of commercial property development were highly contested. Indeed, until 2006, internal 
discussions on this issue failed to leave any imprint on Immochan’s strategy. Immochan’s 
President acknowledged that he liked Pierre’s view but that the dependence on Auchan’s retail 
activities prevented Immochan from implementing them. 
In 2006, Pierre modified his approach and began to lead initiatives that challenged 
Immochan in three main domains: the mission of the company, the positioning of the firm and 
Immochan’s property development practices. Pierre actively challenged Immochan’s mission, 
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which was based on a purely quantitative view of the world, both in terms of the size of new 
commercial spaces and financial results. For example, a poster published by Immochan 
headquarters stated: “ONE objective: 1,000,000 m2 of projects completed over the next 10 
years.” Pierre argued that rather than specifying operational targets, Immochan’s mission 
should reflect its role in society. He proposed that Immochan could play a role in new urban 
development and be a primary force in the evolution of consumption and living habits in 
France. Demonstrating his full personal commitment to this idea, he even agreed to provide 
funding for a book entitled “The Franchised City”, an analysis of urban development by a 
French internationally renowned architect. By making his views public, Pierre began to gain 
legitimacy in the field of retail property development and created a network of people who 
were interested in contemporary views of commercial property development. Pierre used his 
external legitimacy in order to campaign for an alternative strategy at Immochan. 
Pierre also exerted pressure on Immochan’s market positioning. Pierre believed Immochan 
would benefit from being a global real estate operator in markets such as retail, housing and 
office space, and that the company should significantly diversify: 
My view is that the positioning of Immochan is outdated. […] People in society or 
politicians, what do they want? They don’t want us as Auchan anymore. They 
[politicians] want new areas in which people can live and enjoy their lives, work, be 
happy and vote for them again. So, when we address politicians, we should not sell them 
hypermarkets or shops, we should sell them an area in which we can provide a mix of 
activities like housing, offices and shops. (Pierre, Immochan, Interview-2007) 
In addition to attempting to influence Immochan’s market positioning, Pierre also began to 
implement alternative operational practices. Specifically, he hired a new project manager, 
Marc, who shared his vision of the future. Marc joined Immochan from Property X, one of 
Immochan’s main rivals, and had already built a strong reputation in the commercial real estate 
field. 
He is the kind of guy that we need if we want to have things changed at Immochan. I 
think you will see many interesting things if you follow him for some time. (Pierre, 
Immochan, Interview-2006) 
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Pierre knew that Marc had led innovative projects and shared Pierre’s views on the mission 
and positioning of Immochan: 
If [the hypermarket] is now in the periphery, maybe in 30 years it’s going to be part of 
the city. So it should not harm the city. You should always have the vision that we have 
to be visionary. We definitely talk about urban development here! (Marc, Immochan, 
Meeting-2006) 
One of the practices challenged by Pierre and Marc was Immochan’s stance on alliances. 
Immochan had always been very reluctant to develop partnerships because it wanted to 
maintain full control. Partnerships were accepted only in cases in which the firm lacked specific 
technical capabilities. In 2006, Marc proposed a radically new “integrated mall” concept that 
stood in stark contrast to Immochan’s traditional “gallery” model. Delivering the project would 
require partnering with Bosch*, a competitor located next to one of Auchan’s hypermarkets, in 
order to develop a common mall that would totally reshape the existing facilities. 
We want our customers to come to the hypermarket and also visit the shops that make 
them stay as long as possible…So, considering Bosch, we will work on the 
complementarity of offers and competences. They develop a retail park. We develop a 
hypermarket and a gallery. We have to consider the site through a global 
Bosch/Immochan/Auchan view. (Marc, Project Manager, Immochan, Interview-2006) 
Yet, the fact that the project did not follow Immochan’s “gallery” model and the prospect 
of partnering with Bosch created serious tensions, particularly among the Auchan hypermarket 
director, Auchan regional directors and the Immochan regional manager. Immochan managers 
argued that it was impossible to work with people from Bosch. Regional managers refused to 
cooperate with the company and the top management team argued that the required financial 
commitment for the project was too high. Marc’s management practices were severely 
criticized as a result. 
In the end, Pierre became legitimate in the eyes of external proponents of urbanism and in 
the eyes of Immochan top managers as a supporter of an alternative strategy. However people 
at Auchan and middle managers at Immochan considered him a nuisance and as a hindrance in 
the pursuit of their operational targets. 
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Structural separation of explorative initiative. In May 2008, Immochan’s General 
Manager allowed Pierre to create his own subsidiary called Citania. The General Manager gave 
Pierre a chance to pursue his new urban development model, but made it clear that it could not 
happen within Immochan’s structure at the time. 
It was necessary to create Citania because even if we proposed new, ambitious plans for 
the existing sites, Auchan would have had a majority ownership of the project. So in the 
end, the decision makers would have been Auchan. (Immochan President, Interview-
2018) 
By creating Citania, Immochan’s General Manager gave Pierre the opportunity and 
autonomy to develop projects that would fit his urban planning vision. Pierre positioned Citania 
as a developer that would help cities realize a renewed model of urbanism that would combine 
shops, offices and housing: 
Yes, it’s what Mangin says in his book,2 the one we funded. In France, we have regions 
where there are shopping areas, others with individual housing, others with collective 
housing, others with offices, and city centers where shops don’t work and people don’t 
want to live any more. We have to re-create areas where people live, which means they 
can have a range of activities. (Pierre, Immochan, Interview-2008) 
However, Pierre was given few resources to pursue his vision. Pierre had to create a team 
from scratch and was only given a small budget for promotion purposes. Moreover, whereas 
Pierre argued for being fully autonomous (he wanted to pick the relevant opportunity), 
Immochan still required him to work on existing sites. Considering these constraints, Pierre 
feared failure:  
Yes, of course I’m glad they gave me the opportunity to develop what I believe should 
be done. But on the other side, I don’t have a lot of resources and I have to build 
everything by myself. So in the end it hasn’t been won yet, definitely not! (Pierre, Citania 
GM, Interview-2008) 
 
Moreover, they asked me to develop mainly on existing sites, which I did not want 
because I know that is not what Immochan people could accept. So in the end, this was 
hard for me! (Pierre, former Citania GM, Interview-2017) 
                                                 
2 Mangin P. 2004. La ville franchisée (The franchised city). Editions de la Villette: Paris.  
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Yet these constraints also required him to engage in a partnership model that had always been 
contested within Immochan. From the very beginning, Citania began to partner with architects 
and co-developers. Consequently, Citania’s entire project portfolio was built on a partnership 
model. Partners provided financial investments and construction services, and Citania led 
projects, defined the urban model and solicited support from local politicians. In the end, Pierre 
was forced to lead the implementation of the idea he had championed for such a long time.  
There were three main axes for Citania: 1) being able to develop projects on declassified 
fields on which Immochan had failed developing something, 2) renew existing sites on 
which Immochan and Auchan already operated, and 3) develop new sites out of the 
already existing ones, with a rule of mixing activities. (Immochan President, Interview-
2018). 
 
Structural separation maintains parent level exploitation: Since the pressure to change 
was now isolated within Citania, Immochan was in a position to maintain its exploitative 
strategy. Consequently, Immochan development projects once again became more coherent 
and closely aligned with the company’s traditional views. A number of development projects 
that were supposed to transform the way Immochan operated were either abandoned or 
managed in the traditional way. As a result, a number of project managers who shared Pierre’s 
views, including Marc, resigned. These vacancies were largely filled with Auchan staff or 
managers with long tenure at Immochan. Reinforcing Immochan’s traditional strategy after the 
separation of Citania, this new group of project managers justified Immochan’s mission and 
supported the hypermarket model: 
Anyway, we cannot go against the hypermarket. We exist thanks to hypermarkets. They 
attract the customers. We just use their attractiveness power in order to make more 
money. The hypermarket is the center of everything in our business. (Head of Sales, in 
the role of Project Manager, Immochan, Interview-2008) 
Consequently, more ambitious projects that required a partnership model were realigned, which 
meant avoiding partnerships and ensuring subordination to the Auchan retailing division. When 
asked to describe his current project role, one project manager said: 
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Well, the main difficulty is that the rules explicitly say that when we enlarge the 
hypermarket and the shopping area, it is an Auchan developer who takes charge of the 
project. So, I am no longer a project manager. (Project Manager, Immochan, Interview-
2008) 
Period 2: Proximate isomorphism leading to parent level exploration 
While the separation of Citania allowed Immochan to maintain its exploitative strategy, our 
analysis reveals that Citania’s increasing success gradually influenced Immochan top managers 
to copy Citania. We call this phenomenon proximate isomorphism. Below, we describe the role 
of proximate isomorphism in morphing Immochan’s exploitative strategy which ultimately 
resulted in the convergence of Immochan’s and Citania’s strategies (see Table 4). 
------------ INSERT TABLE 4 HERE ------------ 
Explorative initiative success and legitimacy. While Citania’s financial success remained 
limited, its project portfolio demonstrated that an alternative model of real estate activity was 
feasible and viable. Citania, thanks to its approach of new urbanism, developed projects in 
areas where Immochan had always failed. By 2010, Citania was becoming increasingly able to 
demonstrate that this new vision of real estate was economically viable. As Citania gained 
momentum, the owners of Auchan Group became more and more interested in what Citania 
was doing as described by Immochan’s President: 
If I make an assessment of Citania, I would say that mission 1 [developing activities on 
declassified sites that Immochan owned] was a success, mission 3 [developing mixed 
activities on new sites] was a success. But on mission 2 [renewing the existing sites] it’s 
a complete failure because of a conflict of interest. (Immochan President, Interview-
2018). 
 
At that stage, both Pierre as the driver of the initiative and Citania as the structural vehicle 
reached a high level of legitimacy. As Immochan’s President highlighted:  
There were proofs of success […] in areas where Immochan had failed at developing 
[…] [the Mulliez Family] got convinced and seduced by the vision and the know-how of 
Citania. (Immochan President, Interview-2018)  
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Proximate isomorphism. As described previously, Citania successfully engaged in a new 
form of property development that challenged Immochan’s strategy. Immochan gradually 
considered Citania as a new model for development. We call ‘proximate isomorphism’ the 
mechanism through which the parent company gradually imitated the subsidiary. Proximate 
isomorphism involved two sub-mechanisms: vicarious learning and governance changes.  
We use the notion of vicarious learning to describe Immochan’s attempts to learn about 
Citania’s activities and put them into practice. These activities remained vicarious as they were 
not based on formal reporting from Citania to Immochan nor based on mutual meetings, but 
on observing at a distance Citania’s approach to urban development. Our data suggests that 
these activities also referred to projects in which Immochan had previously tried but failed. For 
instance, Citania started to developed headquarters of companies and entire city quarters; 
projects that Immochan had never been able to do.  
I bother them because…I show them that there is another way of doing things, a way 
they had not seen or that they did not want to see, I think, because it’s not their core 
business. (Pierre, Citania GM, 2010) 
Citania was now a legitimate alternative with a distinct vision, new products and new 
practices that were considered an example that the company should follow: 
Little by little, Citania, through its vision, its proofs of success – proofs! – by its knowing 
how to work in a different way with local authorities, to work with partners and not 
against partners, he demonstrated that it was the way for the future. (Immochan President, 
Interview-2018). 
Immochan’s vicarious learning did not only refer to Citania’s activities, but also 
encompassed the traction of new urbanism in the wider context. For instance, Marc, the former 
Immochan project manager hired by Pierre, developed a new iconic shopping center in Paris. 
The development involved transforming the Saint-Lazare train station into a shopping mall. 
Immochan’s management team realized that competitors were successfully developing inner 
city shopping malls and that projects such as the one at Saint-Lazare held enormous potential.  
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And the business is good! One year after the opening of this new consumption temple, 
turnover reached €14.500 per square meter according to the promoter. And it can rise to 
up to €45.000 for some shops. This makes Saint-Lazare the most profitable mall in 
France, says Laurent Morel, CEO of Klépierre*. (Mobilicities.com, 2013)  
Examples such as this prompted Immochan’s top and middle managers to realize that 
Citania’s approach would also work for shopping malls, which were at the heart of their 
activities. Thus, through vicarious learning, managers at Immochan acquired information about 
Citiania’s activities yet also engaged with external, sectoral trends would reinforce the 
relevance of the Citania model. 
Moreover, proximate isomorphism involved substantial changes in organizational 
governance on Immochan level. On the governance side, we have identified two main moves. 
First, Citania’s board was reinforced with outside members that supported Citania’s strategy. 
One of them was a member of Auchan who supported the idea of new urbanism. The aim was 
to increase Citania’s legitimacy inside of Immochan and inside of the Auchan group. Two years 
later, this same person became General Manager of Immochan, and the former General 
Manager became President. Thus, by that point in time, Immochan’s top management was 
completely comprised of Citania supporters, both at a political and at the executive level. 
Tentative parent level exploration. While reflecting on Citania’s activities, Immochan’s 
own strategy raised serious questions. In an interview with the press, Immochan’s CEO 
highlighted Citania’s achievements rather than Immochan’s other activities, creating the 
impression that the whole company had moved from the traditional model to the new one: 
Since 2000 […] Auchan’s subsidiary [Immochan] has chosen to surf on the urban 
mixture wave: places for shopping, integrated in their environment, become real living 
places. Consequently, in 2008 Immochan created Citania, a subsidiary dedicated to 
mixed urban development projects. “While we used to be a typical developer of 
commercial property, we became ‘territory’ developers, with real estate programs that 
combine shops, housing and offices, and even hotels and leisure” (Les Echos, Newspaper, 
2010-12-23) 
Immochan substantially transformed its way of operating by adopting Citania’s new urban 
development model. Immochan’s General Manager even mandated Immochan staff to attend 
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training courses on new urbanism and real estate development, competencies that Citania stood 
for.  
Immochan’s mission statement evolved accordingly. By 2014 it was expressed as: 
“Creating living, retail and experience centers for citizens, customers, brands, partners and 
local authorities” [Website]. Immochan evolved from the cash cow of the Auchan Group to a 
company dedicated to creating what they now called “living centers”. The logo also was 
redesigned to reflect this change (See Figure 3). 
 
------------ INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE ------------ 
The new mission statement opened new possibilities for pursuing real estate projects. 
Projects were no longer restricted to commercial real estate, but could include other types of 
projects such as housing, office space or recreational facilities. This change in mission and 
strategic positioning was also evident in the transformation of Immochan’s operational 
practices. Immochan implemented operational changes such as ad hoc contracting procedures 
with retailers and developers, and lowering ROI expectations for some highly strategic 
projects. Moreover, as Immochan began to imitate Citania’s capabilities, new options for 
development emerged. Exemplary for Immochan’s new ambition was a new flagship project, 
the gigantic Project Europa City, which combined a leisure park, offices, a conference center, 
hotels and shops, and fully reflected Pierre’s vision for new and avant-garde urban areas. Figure 
4 provides visual evidence of this shift by juxtaposing pictures of Immochan’s traditional 
projects against those of new initiatives presented in 2014.  
Europa City is a concrete example of the evolution of our company: urbanism, 
architecture, Urban farming, smart city, construction with inhabitants and the local 
authorities. (Immochan President, e-mail, 2018-02-08) 
 
------------ INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE ------------ 
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The development of integrated urban areas like Project Europa City was based on 
partnerships with architects and other developers. Moreover, linking the project to existing 
urban areas through public transportation also corresponded to the new urban development 
model that Pierre considered essential for the future. The mission, market positioning and 
practices of Immochan converged with those championed by Pierre and Citania that had been 
viewed as threatening to the strategy of the company in 2008. 
By 2014, Immochan was directly competing with Citania for a number of projects. Pierre 
considered this situation to be extremely problematic: 
On some projects, they want to compete with me. Yes, they do! […] This is not funny 
anymore! We don’t want to shoot each other in the foot, right? (Pierre, Citania GM, 
Interview-2011) 
Thus, due to the convergence of Citania’s and Immochan’s strategies middle managers at 
Immochan increasingly viewed Citania as a competitor; in terms of both products and 
capabilities. They ultimately realized that Citania could potentially threaten Immochan’s 
position within the Auchan Group: 
they [people from Immochan] don’t like what we do because what we do threatens them! 
It shows them that they do not have the competencies to do what we do, so it disturbs 
them! (Pierre, Citania GM Interview-2010) 
 
Whereas Pierre focused on competition between Immochan and Citania, the General Manager 
viewed the situation differently. He considered Citania a success but thought that people at 
Immochan were struggling to work the Citania way: 
It was mainly operational people that were blocking the evolution of Immochan. In the 
end, it’s power struggles (Immochan President, Interview-2018) 
 
Moreover, the fact that Citania was run as an explorative initiative outside of Immochan 
increasingly created tensions that had to be resolved. In 2018 Immochan’s President reflected 
on these circumstances  
The fact that on the one side I did not require that Citania makes money, yet on the other 
side people at Immochan had to deliver financial results created jealousy. […] It created 
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a feeling of injustice, and I realized that this could not go on like this. (Immochan 
President, Interview-2018) 
Period 3: Formalizing new strategy via reintegration 
In period 3, Immochan ultimately achieved strategic renewal. This was made by three main 
moves: reintegrating Citania in the daily activities of Immochan, ‘depersonalizing’ Citania and 
formally changing the company’s strategy (see Table 5). 
------------ INSERT TABLE 5 HERE ------------ 
Structural reintegration. As the strategies of Immochan and Citania increasingly 
converged due to proximate isomorphism, Immochan’s new CEO decided to reintegrate 
Citania: 
Ultimately, we considered that Citania had proven its worth. More than a diversification, 
it was the whole Immochan that should become Citania, in the frame of a new project 
and a new vision for the company (Immochan President, Interview-2018) 
 
Moreover, while top management was convinced about the Citania project, some middle 
managers were still reluctant to work with Citania. Immochan’s General Manager and 
President considered that integrating Citania into Immochan would break this resistance would 
allow operational staff to fully engage in “the Citania way”. This was pointed out by 
Immochan’s President: 
Charles [a regional director] is the stereotypical example. He did not want to work with 
Citania. It could not stay like this, we were heading for disaster. Society has moved on, 
Citania is great, we had to make Immochan evolve. It was not about forcing the 
diversification to succeed; the real success was about transforming Immochan! 
(Immochan President, Interview-2018) 
All of Citania’s employees were given positions at Immochan. As the team was still fairly 
small, it became Immochan’s urban renovation department. Whereas Pierre was skeptical about 
his team’s willingness to work for Immochan, people stayed on and they continued to use 
Citania’s work practices:  
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They are keeping the service the way I built it, but I’m not sure that the people I worked 
with will enjoy working for a bigger team like Immochan…but he [the CEO] promised 
that we would keep the functioning of the team. (Pierre, Citania GM, Interview-2014) 
 
Depersonalization and the appropriation of Citania’s legitimacy by Immochan. As Citania 
did not exist anymore, Pierre was asked to take charge of all housing activities within the group. 
However, when Pierre presented his housing strategy, Immochan’s top management was not 
convinced. They realized that for Immochan to become a major player in new urbanism, they 
needed to appropriate Citania’s legitimacy in this space. Some felt that this could not be done 
with Pierre still in the company. His name was too closely linked to Citania’s past. In the end, 
Pierre left the company. When confronted with the question whether Immochan had to 
depersonalize new urbanism the President of Immochan responded: 
“Yes you’re totally right. Richard [the General Manager] was convinced that it was 
a problem of people, so he dissolved Citania in order for Citania to infuse all 
departments and activities of Immochan. He killed the problem this way. Pierre took 
it badly, of course; I regret his leaving, but it was inevitable. (Immochan President, 
Interview-2018) 
 
Development of the new strategy. Although the subsidiary was reintegrated, the name 
Citania was retained as a brand. All of Immochan’s new urban development projects were 
branded as Citania projects. Indeed, an internet search shows that 51 Citania-branded projects 
were developed between July 2014 and April 2016. By then, the partnership model was 
considered absolutely vital in ambitious projects like Project Europa City. For instance, in order 
to provide more financial backing to its projects, Immochan held extensive discussions with 
China’s Wanda group, which led to the establishment of a partnership in 2016: 
On February 26, 2016, Wanda Group and French company Auchan Group signed an 
agreement in Paris. Under the agreement, both parties will co-invest in a large integrated 
cultural, tourism and commercial project in Paris. François Hollande, the President of 
France, met with Chairman Wang Jianlin, congratulating Wanda Group on its major 
project investment in Paris. (Wanda group website, 2016-02) 
 
In 2015, the Auchan group decided to spin-off Immochan (see Appendix 1 for a 
comparison of historic and new organizational charts). Since its creation in the 1970s, 
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Immochan had always been considered a servant to the retail side of the Auchan Group rather 
a stand-alone business. The company is owned by the Mulliez family, which also owns the 
Auchan Group.  
The Auchan Group becomes Auchan Holdings and is organized as three entities 
(Immochan, Accord Bank and Auchan Retail) which will from now on act as independent 
companies. (LSA.com, 2015)   
As an independent entity, Immochan was now free to develop its own strategy independent 
of the demands of the Auchan Group’s retail activities.  
We have worked with Immochan international General Manager for the last two years to 
develop a new vision for Immochan, which actually fulfills all promises of Citania. 
(Immochan President, Interview-2018) 
 
Theoretical Implications 
Transforming in situations where the existing strategy is still generating acceptable profits is 
one of the most difficult challenges firms encounter (Burgelman, 2002; Tushman et al., 2015). 
At the same time, understanding how a firm can accomplish transformation and renewal via 
structural ambidexterity has been a persistent puzzle. This challenge is at the heart of this paper. 
Drawing on the longitudinal case of Immochan, we provide a process perspective of how 
structural ambidexterity may result in strategic renewal of the focal firm. Our findings 
contribute to the extant body of literature on organizational ambidexterity as well as strategic 
renewal. In the sections that follow, we discuss each of our theoretical contributions in greater 
detail. 
The implications of structural ambidexterity for parent level strategic renewal 
This paper shows that structural ambidexterity does not only involve the nurturing of an 
explorative unit but may also result in the transformation of the parent company. In extant 
research, scholars have predominantly considered structural separation as a deliberate 
corporate intervention aimed at nurturing and growing new and innovative ideas in ‘explorative 
units’ (Raisch, 2008; Raisch and Tushman, 2016). Consistent with prior research, we show that 
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structural separation is a way for firms to mitigate tensions between explorative initiatives and 
the exploitative strategy of the parent company (Baden-Fuller and Volberda, 1997; O'Reilly III 
and Tushman, 2013). Separation allows the explorative unit to increase fit with the respective 
market and develop new capabilities that are potentially complementary with the parent 
(Raisch and Tushman, 2016). However, our findings also suggest that beyond developing new 
capabilities and market offerings, structural separation potentially has substantial 
transformative implications for the corporate parent. We argue that such transformation may 
go beyond the inclusion of additional, complementary capabilities but may actually affect a 
shift in strategy and the very purpose of the firm. Indeed, in the case of Immochan, separation 
was necessary as the parent wanted to pursue its path dependent (Burgelman, 2010), 
exploitative strategy based on hypermarkets. Thus, an important condition for parent level 
renewal was breaking path dependency. Raisch (2008) already made the tentative observation 
that exploration in one area of an organization may break path dependency in another. We add 
to this argument by showing that path breaking on parent level may be the result of proximate 
isomorphism which also triggers parent level explorative activities resulting in strategic 
renewal on the corporate level (Baden-Fuller and Volberda, 1997; Mudambi and Swift, 2011; 
O'Reilly III and Tushman, 2013). Indeed, Immochan did not only copy Citania, they also 
started to invest in explorative activities regarding alternative approaches to property 
development resulting in a substantial change in the strategy and mission of the firm. 
The integration of structurally separated units via proximate isomorphism 
The notion of proximate isomorphism extends one of the core debates in research on structural 
ambidexterity; research on the integration mechanisms that link separated units to other parts 
of the organization. Our findings suggest that even in the absence of deliberate integrating 
mechanisms that would ensure knowledge flows between the explorative unit and the parent, 
integration might emerge through proximate isomorphism. We assume that integration via 
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proximate isomorphism is more likely if the tensions that resulted in separation were not only 
manifest on a ‘strategic’ level, but very much permeated the organization, including individual 
relationships, as it was the case at Immochan. Such widespread tensions would reduce the 
likelihood that learning by design or socialization could occur as argued by Kim and Rhee 
(2009). Rather, such tensions imply an increased possibility for vicarious learning, provided 
that the subsidiary accomplishes outcomes that are seen legitimate. Indeed, a number of 
scholars maintain that separation is not sufficient in order to achieve ambidexterity. Rather, it 
requires delicate integration of the explorative and exploitative units to allow appropriate use 
of resources and capabilities (Kauppila, 2010; Gilbert, 2006; Bennett and Robson, 1999). 
Raisch and Birkinshaw (2008) even highlight integration as the main challenge of separation. 
Prior research has already identified a number of such integrating mechanisms such as cross-
functional teams (Jansen et al., 2009) or the synergistic use of practices (Kim and Rhee, 2009). 
Isomorphic activities on parent level are triggered by the combined and aligned legitimacy of 
key individuals driving exploration (‘they can do it’) as well as the organizational legitimacy 
of the explorative unit (‘it is working’). We argue that that it is this combined legitimacy that 
gives rise to two key isomorphic activities: On the one hand, the parent company started 
activities of vicarious learning (Huber, 1991) (through which the parent aims to copy how the 
explorative unit operates). On the other hand, isomorphism also included changes in 
governance; the replacement of senior managers with people subscribing to the vision of the 
explorative unit. These findings tie back to recent research which shows that intra-
organizational vicarious learning is triggered if units start to perceive other units as role models 
(Bresman, 2013). Also, these findings add more nuance to Raisch’s (2008) notion of reverse 
nurturing. In the case of integration via proximate isomorphism, knowledge does not 
intentionally flow from the unit to the parent but is created vicariously, at a distance, on the 
parent level.  
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Towards a dynamic view of ambidexterity: The transition of balancing mechanisms over time  
Our findings also contribute to the emerging ‘dynamic view’ of organizational ambidexterity 
that acknowledges that the solutions to the ambidexterity challenge (balancing mechanisms) 
may shift over time (Simsek, 2009; Markides, 2013). While the organizational tensions 
underlying ambidextrous solutions might endure over long periods (Gilbert, 2006; Raisch, 
2008; Farjoun, 2007), the relationship between parent and units evolves as explorative units 
gain legitimacy, scale up and grow (Raisch and Tushman, 2016). Indeed, Westerman et al. 
(2006) already argue that balancing mechanisms such as structural separation might be 
followed by more integrated forms of managing the ambidexterity challenge (Lubatkin et al., 
2006; Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). We specify the mechanisms that underpin this 
transformation. Prior research has particularly emphasized the role of the top management team 
(Smith and Tushman, 2005) and the relationship between managers on different levels of the 
organization (Raisch and Tushman, 2016) for balancing conflicting demands. Our paper 
contributes to this debate by describing two mechanisms that support the transition of balancing 
mechanisms: governance changes and the depersonalization of legitimacy. Governance 
changes via changes in management create ‘readiness’ for integration on parent level. In the 
case of Immochan, the new management was able to appreciate the future complementarity of 
the Citania’s capability despite operational frictions. Second, for the integrated management of 
explorative and exploitative activities in the market, the parent organization needs to have 
legitimacy for both activities. Yet, our findings suggest that the legitimacy of explorative 
activities often lies with key individuals that use their legitimacy to influence and create 
autonomy (Raisch and Tushman, 2016). By depersonalizing legitimacy, firms transfer 
legitimacy from the individual to the organization level which further reduces organizational 
tensions. This transfer of legitimacy may require changes in key staff or even the removal key 
individuals involved in strategic initiatives (as shown in this case) in order to allow smooth 
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reintegration. Our findings are consistent with prior research, which shows that legitimacy of 
a unit may be transferred to other units of the same organization or even the center (Kostova 
and Zaheer, 1999; Dobrev et al., 2006). 
Conclusions: Boundary conditions and future research 
Our findings are subject to a number of boundary conditions. It is reasonable to assume that 
Pierre was a driving force in terms of pushing for a new urban development model, and 
demonstrating that it is viable. Also, as highlighted in previous research (Zimmermann et al., 
2015) initiatives may be defined top down, or indeed autonomously (Burgelman, 1983) as has 
been the case at Immochan. Further, reintegration was not down to Pierre but was based on 
proximate isomorphism, unleashed by Citania’s legitimacy. Lastly, the new urbanism 
promoted by Citania was consistent with broader industry and societal shifts. The following 
boundary conditions therefore apply to our case: such a separation and reintegration process 
can be observed in cases where (1) autonomous strategic initiatives exist (2) these initiatives 
are successful enough to build legitimacy (3) this legitimacy is consistent with broader societal 
and industry shifts.  
These three factors may trigger proximate isomorphism that leads to reintegration and 
potentially strategic renewal. Whether strategic renewal of the parent occurs, would depend on 
whether the capabilities and business model of the explorative subsidiary are judged by the 
senior team of the parent as being fundamental to the strategic future of the corporation, as was 
the case at Immochan. Otherwise, reintegration could simply lead to the addition of a particular 
capability to the parent’s portfolio of capabilities. Top management’s evaluation of the strategic 
importance of the subsidiary’s capabilities is thus a boundary condition for whether 
reintegration leads to strategic renewal of the parent, or simply capability enhancement.  
Our findings also have implications for future research. The strategic benefit of structural 
separation is contingent on the dynamic relationship between parent- and unit-level capabilities 
Forthcoming in Strategic Organization 
 33 
over time. While Raisch and Tushman (2016) have already started to map out complex 
interaction patterns between explorative and exploitative units, future research on structural 
ambidexterity could consider proximate isomorphism as a particular interaction pattern in 
structurally ambidextrous firms. While this paper highlights legitimacy as a salient trigger of 
isomorphism in the case of Immochan, and both vicarious and contextual learning as enabling 
factors, future ambidexterity research could further investigate the organizational conditions 
that give rise to isomorphic integration. Moreover, we also encourage further research on the 
appropriation of legitimacy through reintegration. For instance, what are the factors that enable 
such appropriation to occur and how do external stakeholders such as customers, regulators or 
analysts react to such moves and to what effect? Overall, this paper emphasizes that structural 
ambidexterity is not a singular strategic move; in contrast, it is part of a sequential game of 
separation and reintegration that can fundamentally reshape a firm’s future. 
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Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Timeline of events. 
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Figure 2. Strategic renewal through structural separation and reintegration 
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Figure 3. Evolution of Immochan Logo in 2012 
 
 
 
Old model 
(hypermarket, shops and gallery) 
New model 
(integrated urban areas) 
 
 
  
  
 
Figure 4. Comparison of Immochan’s previous development model and new development model. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Overview of financial results, in M€  
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Auchan World 33,000 34,200 36,150 38,800 40,000 41,800 43,600 46,900 48,100 53,500 NA 
Auchan France 18,000 18,200 18,700 19,300 18,600 19,100 19,600 20,300 20,100 19,700 NA 
Immochan World 305 328 375 434 466 496 515 615 637 594 581 
Immochan France 161 175 205 230 250 257 268 280 281 273 265 
Citania    - - 0.2 0.7 1.4 1.4 0.7 - 
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Table 2. Data sources and use 
Data source Type of data Use in the analysis 
Observations 
(559 double- 
spaced pages) 
Extensive transcripts of project 
development meetings (17): transcripts of 
conversations; observed relationships 
among the various entities of the group. 
Identify tensions in the practice of 
strategy and how tensions are addressed. 
Informal conversations: informal 
discussions with project managers, regional 
directors, urbanists, marketing directors, 
partners which ranged from brief 
exchanges to long talks before and after 
meetings. 
Gain trust of informants, familiarize 
with the context, debrief about social 
interactions during meetings. 
Interviews 
(672 double-spaced 
pages) 
Preliminary interviews (3): with senior and 
middle managers to enter the field and 
understand the context. 
Familiarize with the context. 
Focused interviews (38): with project 
managers, head of sales, regional 
managers, head of marketing, developers 
and sales partners. Most people were 
interviewed twice in order to grasp the 
evolution of situation. 
Improve our understanding of the 
situation, as well as the evolution of 
tensions and understandings. 
Informal interviews (23): with the initiator 
of the tensions and director of the focal 
subsidiary, used as a key informant. 
Understand the sources of internal 
tensions, investigate the relationship 
between the subsidiary and the parent 
company, understand the practice 
rationale implemented by the subsidiary. 
Retrospective interview (1): with the 
president of the company after the whole 
story took place  
Understand the parent company top 
managers’ view and triangulate with the 
key informant 
Get information about late parent 
company transformation 
Internal documents 
(25 / 123 pages) 
Citania Presentations (7): pre-creation 
presentations working documents and 
various presentations of the Citania 
activities 
Consulting report (1): indicating 
organization issues that Immochan and 
Citania faced 
Understand the negotiation about Citania 
positioning 
Understand Citania activities in the way 
it is presented to Immochan 
Triangulate with interviews about issues 
faced by the company 
 
 Training session description (1): Indicating 
the type of competences aimed at by 
Immochan people 
Triangulate with interview about the 
type competences developed at 
Immochan 
Media Parent company-related news: news about 
the projects, market positioning, and the 
evolution of strategy and structures 
Analyze the strategy of the parent 
company and its evolution over time. 
Subsidiary related news: news about the 
creation, the projects, the practices 
Investigate the practices of the 
subsidiary, obtain inputs for informal 
interviews, triangulate with formal 
interviews. 
 Table 3. Supporting data for period 1: Mitigating tensions through structural separation 
Themes Representative quotes 
Exploitative strategy at parent company 
Managers’ 
understanding of 
Immochan’s 
strategy 
 
 “Well, when we develop a project we don’t really think about the future. We rather think about constraints, about internal regulation, stuff like that!” (Leisure Park 
Project Manager, Immochan partner, Interview-2006) 
“-Bosch Project Manager: Yes, but you are here today! It means that mentalities change 
-Marc (Immochan): No, if we are here, it’s because we [two project managers] have worked together before! I don’t agree; mentalities have not changed at all!” 
(Meeting, 2007) 
“I told him [Bosch manager]! I saw him last week at the MIPIM [International Fair of Real Estate], I told him, ‘You know that there is an important issue to be resolved. 
I’ve seen the sketches. They are very ambitious.’ It’s true they are very interesting. But if there is an underground parking lot which takes 1 year to build, the real 
question is: How will the hypermarket run during this time?…So if we do not have an answer to this, nothing will happen!” (Regional Director, Immochan, Interview-
2007) 
Organizational 
constraints 
“We have more constraints…We have a strong constraint; it’s to have a high ROI. Build as cheaply as possible, avoid damage and create a symbiosis with Auchan. 
Bosch is solo. They have a lower ROI than us, they can be audacious. I have to confess that we do not have the same budgets.” (Concept Manager, Interview-2007) 
“It’s true that Auchan’s interests are not always the same as ours [Immochan], but anyway we have to find a consensus. We have no choice!” (Integrated Mall Regional 
Director, Immochan, Interview-2007) 
There have always been power struggles between Immochan since it was created in 1976 and Auchan. There has always been a king of conflict in order to know who 
would take the leadership of development. Is it the real estate that […] was the locomotive? (Immochan President, Interview-2018) 
Lack of ambition 
 
“-Regional Director (Immochan): “I want to make sure that everybody is in line with the last work of Marc and Bosch… I’m not certain about it because the last time I 
got a report of the meeting between Bosch and Marc, [ironic tone] it was a wonderful sketch, very ambitious… 
-Hypermarket Director: (Auchan) “Yes, I’ve seen it as well… [ironic tone] It’s wonderful! 
- Regional Director: [ironic tone] Yes, it is wonderful, very ambitious. But, I thank Bosch for planning so many projects in our area… I thank them! I wanted to avoid 
them being here this afternoon to tell us what we have to do. [ironic tone] They will improve your hypermarket, you know! (Laughs)” (Meeting, 2007) 
“-Planning Manager (Immochan): So, on the existing elements, we create parking here, we lift the building in order to place it at the same level as the mall and the second 
level, and we propose a shopping street here. 
-Technical Manager (Immochan/Auchan): Wait, what are you drawing here? 
- Concept Manager (Immochan): Bosch and Marc’s project. 
- Regional Director (Immochan): [Mocking the concept manager]It’s fucking good, isn’t it? It’s very well done! 
- Concept Manager (Immochan): Yes, it’s a very good idea! 
- Development Manager (Auchan): Very good idea, indeed! 
- Regional Director (Immochan): Yes, [ironic tone] they have good ideas at Bosch. You should have some training there sometimes!” (Meeting, 2007-05-10) 
“We could have the same ideas, not a problem. But the costs are not acceptable here. Here, they want the butter, the money of the butter, the dairywoman and the cow 
altogether! So it constrains our options! …But hey, Bosch is much more avant-garde than we are. They work in many countries, they work with famous architects, they 
have high performing teams. We have to confess that they are better than we are!” (Planning Manager, Immochan, Interview-2007) 
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Table 3. continued 
Themes Representative quotes 
Change pressures due to explorative initiative 
Pressure on 
mission  
“From now on, we will no longer be satisfied with hypermarket galleries…we will exploit urban center galleries, with or without food venues. Moreover, we will answer public 
authorities’ appeals, even if it is a project at the ground level of a housing estate.” (Pierre, Immochan, Interview-2006) 
“Honestly, when I talk about politics, about life of the city, I strongly believe in it. We participate in the development of cities. In the end what is a commercial center? It’s the 
former agora of the Greeks, the former marketplace, where people meet and discuss.” (Marc, Immochan, Interview-2007) 
Pressure on 
positioning 
“Immochan wants to develop housing and offices…Immochan aims at ‘accompanying the evolution of lifestyles, in being a global actor of development, which includes mixed 
developed including shops, offices and housing.’” (Les Echos website, 2006) 
“I think that it’s a question of positioning. A positioning…that promotes a different view. Mainly not to see the project through a retailing lens. Not only through a commercial lens. 
But rather to get what we call mixed urban projects. That is to say to treat projects like territories where we make housing, offices and shopping.” (Pierre, Interview-2007) 
“What we [Immochan] could provide to the hypermarket, to the population and to politicians would be a new concept of territory developer…that would be identified as a quality 
concept…and the difference we could provide is to propose a very ambitious concept to prove our role of territory developer.” (Project Manager, Immochan, Interview-2007) 
Pressure on 
practices  
“This is why we really have to become partners. Today, we compete. But we need to move beyond this point so that we become partners. Today, nobody is willing to concede 
anything. To me, it indicates that neither they nor we have understood the history of facts!” (Project Manager, Immochan, Interview-2006) 
“Well, we had a very constructive meeting with Bosch in the way that we more or less met their expectations. So, we showed them a plan without constraints, with an exchange of 
documents. They gave us various studies, the plans they had, and a project that they have for recreating the site.” (Project Manager, Immochan, Meeting-2006) 
“Bosch Project Manager: Yes, you’re right. We have to go to the maximum of our possibilities. With your option, we can create a lot of square meters. And more, profitable square 
meters! Marc (Immochan): “Yes, right, but here we kind of dream! We are no longer into a conservative plan, right? It’s the big things here! 
Bosch Project Manager: Yes, but the objective is to make profitable projects. If we want it to be profitable for Immochan and for Bosch, the site has to reinforce its potential for both 
companies. Otherwise it’s not worth doing something in common. Marc (Immochan): “Sincerely, I love this project!” (Meeting, 2007) 
Structural separation 
Creating a 
subsidiary 
“’We developed real know-how within Immochan as urban developers around our hypermarkets,’ explains Pierre…With 300 shopping centers and 9,000 commercial leases Immochan 
is well armed...” (Le Moniteur website, 2008) 
“Consequently, in 2008 Immochan created Citania, a subsidiary dedicated to mixed urban development projects. ‘From traditional commercial property developers, we developed into 
territory developers, with real estate programs that combine shops, housing and offices, and even hotels and leisure, all this integrated with the city,’ explained Hervé Motte, CEO of 
Immochan France. ‘Actually, we became a territory designer who designs programs with representatives.’” (Les Echos Newpaper, 2010) 
Implementing 
alternative 
mission, 
positioning and 
practices 
“We have quite few resources! I don’t have project managers, marketing directors, developers, etc. What I have is a team of urban planners that tries to understand what should be done 
in order to develop land in a relevant way.” (Pierre, Citania GM, interview-2008) 
“And the whole model is different. On the Banquix headquarters building, I proposed something conceptual. I work with partners who implement my idea and I rely on them. I don’t 
own the land. I work in partnerships. Anyways, I don’t have the resources to do it another way!” (Pierre, Citania GM, Interview-2008) 
“Citania, the Immochan subsidiary, specialized in mixed urban program development, BNP Paribas Immobilier and the city of d'Ivry-sur-Seine joined recently to set the first stone of 
Ivry Grand Place project.” (affiches-parisiennes.com, 2013) 
Enabling parent 
to maintain its 
exploitative 
strategy 
 
“I get paid to say, ‘Well, in 10 years, what will this site look like?’ My vision is to say that we need to check whether the guy that we will hire for the program fits with the philosophy of 
the program. We should not forget that we are here to develop Auchan sites…this is our philosophy!” (Immochan Head of Sales, Interview-2008) 
“It is the ambiguity of our organization. On the one hand, we hear that we may develop alternative concepts, but we keep on working for Auchan and the ultimate goal is to improve the 
hypermarket attractiveness.” (Project Manager,Immochan,  Interview-2008) 
“Indeed, project managers, and especially the one who came from outside, tell us that the relationship between Auchan and Immochan is complicated and that it requires a lot of effort to 
manage it.” (Head of Project Organization, Immochan, Interview-2009) 
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Table 4. Supporting data for period 2: Proximate isomorphism leading to parent level exploration 
Themes Representative quotes 
Explorative initiative success and legitimacy 
Projects in areas 
where parent 
company failed 
“We have fields around our headquarters at Croix. I use it in order to build the new headquarters of the bank Accor. This is something Immochan would never do. They 
don’t have the competencies!” (Pierre, Citania GM, Interview-2014) 
“Immochan and Auchan had failed creating anything on these areas, and Citania created value on them with new programs” (Immochan President, Interview-2018). 
“Immochan could never have done what Citania sourced and could developed. Because it was more with small shop format, with local stores, we did housing, offices, etc. 
That, really, is a success.” (Immochan President, Interview-2018). 
Development of 
alternative 
practices 
“Citania is not here to sell shops. Citania aims at developing new ways to develop cities. So he act like partners. We don’t go to meet people when we need them. We 
integrate into everyday life. You know, I go very often to public event, when mayors and other local representative are present. I just talk with them, I ask them if they are 
ok, sometime I connect them with other people. I don’t sell them anything. I just act as a piece of the puzzle in the city. Which is hard because there are many sites that are 
options for us. But if you don’t do that, people know that you are just here to sell them something. They don’t consider you the same way.” (Pierre, Citania GM, Interview-
2013) 
“We associated with local partners, with co-developers, etc.” (Immochan President, Interview-2018). 
“Citania, with its name and its way of operating, was not associated with Auchan. Auchan has quite a bad Image. An image of people who have destroyed the cities entries. 
And Immochan is closely associated with Auchan. Citania is perceived a totally different way.” (Immochan President, Interview-2018). 
Favorable 
perception by 
majority 
shareholder 
“I met Gerard [Auchan group founder, 4th fortune in France] at a funeral and he believes in what we do. He supports Citania. That’s good for us!” (Pierre, Citania GM, 
Interview-2012) 
“The owners liked the vision, they had understood that this was the avenue for the future” (Immochan President, Interview-2018) 
“Citania built the headquarters of the group bank with a 100% BREEAM building. And it’s just next to our headquarters, which helped a lot.” (Immochan President, 
Interview-2018). 
Proximate isomorphism 
Vicarious 
learning 
“Well, at the moment, it appears as if we are in competition. Actually, they see that I attracted very good guys on my team and they see that this produces the effect of being 
much more innovative than they are. So they wonder how they can compete with that because they don’t like that our small structure challenges them!” (Pierre, Citania GM, 
Interview-2012) 
“Citania suffered from jealousy… but also for the best because it made things move, also!” (Immochan President, Interview-2018) 
“We also worked with partners with which we did not used to work with […] So, it was the beginning of partnership that Citania launched, and we, as Immochan, could 
partners with them, because we have the retail competencies and they bring in housing and offices development competencies. Partnering with housing and office developers 
at 50/50 was a great success.” (Immochan President, Interview-2018) 
 “A new kind of mall…The new Saint-Lazare mall in Paris was inaugurated on March 1. On 10,000 square meters, 80 shops will open in 15 days. Each level caters to a 
different type of customer. Services (pharmacy, medical center, banking and food) face the alcoves for travelers waiting for their trains. Facing the metro access and the 
street are mass distribution shops (Carrefour City, Daily Monop’, Esprit) intended for inhabitants of the quarter as well as for the 450,000 travelers who visit the station 
daily. The objective: catch the consumers who have less time to shop and go online at any time…” (Le Monde Newspaper, 2012) 
Governance 
alignment 
“We faced internal problem as the people from Auchan and some people from Immochan did not want to work with us. So we decided with my boss to reinforce the board in 
order to have more power. This is when Richard arrived as a board member. He was at Auchan, and he supported the project. The irony is that he is the one that fired me a 
few years later” (Pierre, Former Citania GM, Interview-2017) 
“In the board that I built, at least that I validated, because Pierre had huge autonomy, but the advisory board was made more infused with the Citania vision […]. So we 
integrated people from Immochan and people from Auchan. And the role of this committee was to oversee the vision and to oversee the implementation of the vision.” 
(Immochan President, Interview-2018) 
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Table 4. continued 
Themes Representative quotes 
Tentative explorative parent company strategy 
Change of 
mission in line 
with Citania 
“‘Improving daily life.’ This is our strategic positioning. It defines and guides everything we do to create living centers that are integrated into the local area, creating 
interaction between different segments of society and between different generations, forging social links, while protecting the environment. It aspires to give more soul and 
more direction to each center, while interacting with its ecosystem.” (Immochan website, 2014) 
“Project Europa City is the manifestation that the ideas and concepts I proposed during the last decade can be done and are certainly the future of Immochan.” (Pierre, 
Citania GM, Interview-2013) 
“The project, of which promoters explain that it is ‘not only commercial,’ explain that it will be developed in the 300 hectares of the Gonnesse triangle.” (Les Echos 
Newspaper, 2011) 
Development of 
new practices 
and 
competences  
 “The Auchan group does not shoulder the €1.7bn investment on its own. The group should call for sovereign funds.” (Les Echos Newspaper, 2011) 
“And [the Immochan Regional Director] detailed his method. Here, he would assign plots for the construction of offices or reserve space for the realization of a 
transportation hub. Here, he would cooperate with a developer for housing programs. “ (LSA.com, 2014) 
“And I got to know that they had developed a training session about development. I really wanted to know what this was about, they had never done that before and now 
they propose this! I asked my assistant to get to know more about it” (Pierre, Former Citania GM, Interview-2017) 
Reluctance of 
middle 
managers to 
change 
 
 “The top management was convinced, the owners were convinced, but the operational people by Immochan were reluctant. It was not their culture! So this was hard to make 
them move (Immochan President, Interview-2018) 
“I do not have any pieces to give you one that point. You know, power struggle don’t go through formal media. There’s always been reluctance by operational people but 
they would not write anything down about it. Sorry” (Pierre, Former Citania GM, Interview-2017) 
“On a site like Fontenay, it was obvious that we had to thin another way than purely retail. But it was a failure; It’s companies life: there are people conflicts, there are 
conflicts of interest, there are silos, there are people who don’t want to work together” (Immochan President, Interview-2018) 
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Table 5. Supporting data for period 3: Formalizing new strategy via reintegration 
Themes Representative quotes 
Structural reintegration  
Dissolution of 
Citania 
“It seems that the new team [and new General Manager] do not have the same view as I have. They think that we should be reintegrated into Immochan. I think this would 
be a shame because it took 5 years to develop our identity, our competencies and to be able to be recognized as a relevant actor in urbanism.” (Pierre, Citania GM, 
Interview-2014) 
“So, yes, it’s done. They are reintegrating Citania into Immochan; the subsidiary will not exist anymore. We will bring all of our people into Immochan and we hope we 
can develop the same kind of activities inside Immochan.” (Pierre, Citania GM, Interview-2014) 
“It’s hard for me because I’ve put so much effort into this company and now they are taking everything I’ve done and I won’t be a general director anymore.” (Pierre, 
Citania GM, Interview-2014) 
Retention of 
Citania brand 
“(Re) qualifying existing territories. The speakers will be…Pierre (Director Citania/Immochan)…” (Up magazine website, 2015) 
“Citania survives as they kept the brand for all projects where there is a mix of activities. It has become a symbol of urban renewal so they don’t want to let it die.” (Pierre, 
Former Citania GM, Interview-2015) 
“Citania/Immochan. In the Auchan Group, I created the brand Citania in order to implement mixed urban projects, with or without commercial component…Pierre, Head 
of Urban Strategies & Environment.” (wikibuilding.paris, partners book website, 2016-02-02) 
Depersonalization and legitimacy appropriation 
Legitimacy 
transfer from 
Citania to 
parent 
“I thought, it’s not possible! People like Charles… I will make Citania fail whereas it’s something extraordinary! So we did it another way. We make the whole company 
evolve on the Citania model and now it’s a great success” (Immochan President, Interview-2018) 
“I preferred to reintegrate Citania so that Immochan integrates the legitimacy and the professionalism of Citania.” (Immochan President, Interview-2018) 
Need to avoid 
power issues 
with the former 
Head of Citania 
“Researcher: In my view, it appears as if they need to move you out otherwise, as the company takes the strategy that you developed over the last years, they would need you 
at the head of the company; Pierre: yes. You know, I just met [Richard] last week. He is on the board of Immochan [and holds a very political position]. You know what he 
told me? He told me that [the new General Manager] was afraid of me. I don’t understand this. I even proposed to train a successor to secure my legacy. But even without 
me, I don’t mind. I understood that I, as myself, could be a problem. That’s why I proposed this. But no, he didn’t want this.” (Pierre, Former Citania GM, Interview-2017) 
“You know, the General Manager thought that it was like having a state in the state. Politically, it is not an easy position” (Immochan President, Interview-2018) 
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Table 5. continued 
Themes Representative quotes 
Development of the new strategy 
Auchan spins 
out Immochan 
“Auchan Holding bears the name of its historic business, the retail business, launched in 1961 by Gérard Mulliez. Since November 2015, it has been structured as 3 independent 
companies, each dedicated to its specific business to better meet their customers’ expectations.” (https://www.auchan-holding.com, 2018) 
 “We are no more dependent of Auchan. Of course, we still work a lot with them but we are no more dependent of Auchan. Before, we were dependent. So we move from 
dependence to autonomy. And a recognized autonomy, with a new vision” (Immochan President, Interview-2018) 
“Wilhelm Hubner, chairman of the management board of Auchan Holding, commented on the 2016 results, “The year that has just finished was a year of major changes for 
the three Auchan Holding companies. As a result of the new structure that was put in place at the end of 2015, Auchan Retail, Immochan and [financial institution] Oney have 
become more independent, more successful and more focused on their core businesses” (https://www.esmmagazine.com, 2017) 
New Immochan 
strategy based 
on Citania 
“Vision 2030: we link people by creating sustainable, smart & lively places to brighten up everyday life. Meeting people’s and communities’ needs. Acting as a global urban 
player. Animating places and communities. #co #committed #care #innovative” (New Mission Statement Flyer, email from Immochan President-2018) 
“it took us one year to write this new vision, with all countries. My main message is that we used Citania’s mission in order to re-write our mission. That’s my key message” 
(Immochan President, Interview-2018) 
“So, it took us about one year to rewrite it, based on Citania’s one, but also based on the examples of Citania, and on the Europa City project, which is currently our flagship 
project, and which has nothing to do with what we used to do with Auchan and Immochan” (Immochan President, Interview-2018) 
Development of 
mixed activity 
projects 
“The funny thing is that they just acquired a housing developer for 300 million euros! I proposed them two years ago to acquire one for 70 million. They considered it was 
not the good solution. It seems they changed their mind!” (Pierre, Former Citania GM, Interview-2017) 
“Immochan launches it’s first beyond retail challenge. The Beyond Retail challenge is an international competition that aims at transforming shopping centers in daily life 
areas.” (ladn.eu website, 2018) 
Rebranding 
 
“I just got to know that they want to change the name. I heard that Citania is one option but I don’t know if they will take it.” (Pierre, Former Citania GM, Interview-2017) 
“We will even change the name. I cannot tell you what name it is going to be but Immochan is no more in line with what we want to do. We have evolved. The name needs 
to evolve as well” (Immochan President, Interview-2018) 
“we could have used Citania as a name, but internationally, this was not possible. For legal reasons and as well for linguistic understanding in some countries” (Immochan 
President, Interview-2018) 
 
 Appendix 
 
 
Appendix 1. Historic and new structures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organizations 
Auchan Group: Company owns by the Mulliez Family (has three branches; retail, real estate, 
bank until 2015) 
Auchan: the retail branch of the Auchan Group (until 2015, then directly owned by the 
Mulliez Family) 
Bosch (disguised name): competitor of Immochan in the commercial real estate area 
Citania: Subsidiary of Citania (2008-2015) dedicated to developing new urban projects 
Klepierre: competitor of Immochan in the commercial real estate area 
Immochan: Real Estate branch of the Auchan Group (until 2015, then directly owned by the 
Mulliez Family) 
 
Retail formats 
Gallery: integrated street in front of a supermarket or hypermarket with shops (hairdresser, 
shoe seller, banks, travel agency, spirits shop, beauty shops, etc.) 
Hypermarket: (equivalent to big bow store or superstore) shopping area that sells food, 
cosmetics, high-tech, cultural goods, clothes, etc., shop floor space over 2.500m2 
Supermarket: shopping area that sells primarily food and cosmetics with a shop floor space 
under 2.500m2 
Appendix 2. Glossary 
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